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9.1  Introduction 
Because the effects of monetary policy on the aggregate economy have long 
lags, monetary policy must necessarily be preemptive; that is, it must act well 
before inflation starts to rise.' This, of course, is easier said than done. In order 
to act preemptively, monetary policymakers must have signals that help them 
forecast future changes in inflation. One such signal that has received substan- 
tial attention both in the academic literature and in the press is the gap between 
unemployment and NAIRU, the nonaccelerating inflation rate of  unemploy- 
ment.* In other words, NAIRU is the unemployment rate at which inflation is 
expected to neither increase or decrease. 
The NAIRU concept has come under quite serious attack in recent years. In 
the early to mid-l990s, the common view in the economics profession was 
that NAIRU in the United States was around 6 percent. However, when the un- 
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1. If price stability has already been achieved, then inflation falling below its target is every bit 
as damaging as a rise in inflation above the target. Thus, in this situation, monetary policy must 
also be just as preemptive against declines in inflation below target levels. 
2. See, e.g., Stiglitz (1997), Gordon (1997), Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997a,  1997b), and 
Council of Economic Advisers (1997, 45-54).  For a history of  NAIRU, see Espinosa-Vega and 
Russell (1997). The NAIRU acronym would better be expressed as NIIRU (the nonincreasing 
inflation rate of unemployment) because it is the unemployment rate at which inflation is expected 
to neither increase or decrease. 
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employment rate began to fall below 6 percent in 1995 and remained well be- 
low that level thereafter without any increase in inflation-indeed  inflation actu- 
ally fell-concern  arose that the NAIRU concept might be seriously flawed. 
In addition, recent academic research has shown that there is great uncertainty 
in the estimates of NAIRU (e.g., Staiger et al. 1997a, 1997b), suggesting that 
looking at the unemployment rate relative to NAIRU might not be a very help- 
ful guide for monetary policy. 
In this paper, we rethink the NAIRU concept and examine whether NAIRU 
might have a useful role in monetary policy making. We argue that the answer 
is yes. However, the positive answer depends critically on redefining NAIRU 
very carefully and distinguishing it from a long-run concept like the natural 
rate of unemployment, something that is not typically done in the literature. 
Furthermore, as we will see, the view that the NAIRU concept implies that the 
monetary authorities should try to move the economy toward the NAIRU, thus 
to some extent treating it as a target, is both incorrect and misguided. 
The first  step in our analysis,  in  section  9.2, is to think  about defining 
NAIRU in the context of  setting monetary policy  instruments. We  adopt a 
definition that focuses on NAIRU as a reference point for monetary policy and 
show that our definition of NAIRU is a short-run concept and is not the same 
as the natural rate of unemployment. Understanding that short-run NAIRU and 
the natural rate of unemployment differ is important, not only for the theoreti- 
cal analysis to follow, but also because it suggests that short-run NAIRU is 
likely to be highly variable, in contrast to the natural rate of unemployment. 
One immediate implication is that thinking of NAIRU as a level at which the 
unemployment rate should settle is not very useful for policy purposes. 
Our approach to the construction of short-run NAIRU is fairly general. Al- 
though we define this concept in the context of a particular model of inflation 
that is adapted from the current literature, the same approach can be applied to 
any predictive model of inflation in which unemployment plays an important 
role. 
Once we have defined short-run NAIRU, we then go on to examine how it 
might be used in policy making. We do this in several steps. First, we look 
in section 9.3 at the certainty-equivalent case, when only inflation enters the 
policymakers’  objective function and then when unemployment  (or equiva- 
lently, output) as well as inflation are part of policymakers’  objectives. Al- 
though the certainty-equivalent case is useful as a starting point for the analy- 
sis, we cannot stop here because several sources of uncertainty have important 
implications for how monetary policy should be conducted. In addition to un- 
certainty about estimates of the actual value of  NAIRU, there is uncertainty 
about the estimated parameters of the model, especially the parameters that 
measure the effect of the NAIRU gap on inflation and the impact of monetary 
policy instruments on the NAIRU gap. We examine in section 9.4 what effect 
these sources of uncertainty have on how short-run NAIRU might be used in 
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when unemployment as well  as inflation enter the policymakers’ objective 
function. 
Our theoretical analysis shows that uncertainty about the level of short-run 
NAIRU does not necessarily imply that monetary policy should react less to 
the NAIRU gap. However, uncertainty about the effect of the NAIRU gap on 
inflation does require an adjustment to the reference point for monetary tight- 
ening in terms of the level of unemployment and to the weight applied to the 
gap between actual and target inflation. Furthermore, as in Brainard (1967), 
uncertainty about the effect of the monetary policy instrument on the NAIRU 
gap reduces the magnitude of the policy response. 
There is another sense in which uncertainty about NAIRU may have an ef- 
fect on policy. There may be uncertainty not just about the level of NAIRU or 
its effect but about the way it is modeled: the exact form of the model specifica- 
tion may be unknown. Errors in model selection may result in excess uncer- 
tainty regarding both inflation forecasts and the parameters of the model. Thus 
model selection has the potential to increase uncertainty about the effect of the 
NAIRU gap and to reduce the effectiveness of policy, and the magnitude of 
this problem may be more difficult to determine than that of simple parameter 
uncertainty. In section 9.5, we focus on the losses associated with leaving out 
key information from the model. 
Although our theoretical framework shows the qualitative effects of uncer- 
tainty on how monetary policy should be conducted, it cannot tell us whether 
these effects are economically important. To examine this question, we esti- 
mate in section 9.6 a simple NAIRU gap model for the United States to obtain 
quantitative measures of uncertainty and to assess how these measures affect 
our view of the optimal reaction of monetary policy to movements in unem- 
ployment relative to short-run NAIRU. Using an analogous model based on 
monthly data, we then examine how in practice the short-run NAIRU concept 
could be used in the actual conduct of monetary policy. The estimated models 
provide us with measures of  short-run NAIRU that indicate that it is highly 
variable,  suggesting that  trying  to  drive  the  unemployment  rate  toward 
NAIRU, whether it is a short-run or a long-run concept, would be an inappro- 
priate way to think about how monetary policy should be conducted. In partic- 
ular, we use our analysis to evaluate whether the setting of  monetary policy 
instruments in the face of rapidly falling unemployment rates in recent years 
makes sense. 
9.2  Defining Short-Run NAIRU: Why It Differs 
from the Natural Rate of Unemployment 
The concept of  the natural rate of  unemployment was  first developed by 
Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968) to argue that there would be no long-run 
trade-off between unemployment and inflation. The natural rate of unemploy- 
ment is defined as the level of  unemployment to which the economy would 408  Arturo Estrella and Frederic S. Mishkin 
converge in the long run in the absence of structural changes to the labor mar- 
ket. An implication of this definition is that expansionary monetary policy that 
leads to higher inflation would not be able to produce lower unemployment on 
average. Indeed, as mentioned in Friedman (1  968), higher inflation might even 
have the opposite effect of raising unemployment in the long run because it 
would interfere with efficient functioning of  labor markets. The concept of 
a natural rate of unemployment leads to the following characterization of  an 
expectations-augmented Phillips curve: 
IT,  =  7Fp +  P(L)(u, - i,)  +  6'2, +  E,, 
where 
IT,  = inflation rate from t -  1 to t 
IT; = inflation rate expected at t -  1 
u,  = unemployment rate at time t 
u,  = natural rate of unemployment at time t, which could be a constant but 
z,  = a vector of variables such as supply shocks, which have zero ex ante 
E,  = an unspecified disturbance term 
In order to estimate this expectations-augmented Phillips curve, researchers 
typically assume that the expected inflation can be measured as a distributed 
lag on past inflation and other variables, and that the inflation rate is integrated 
of  order one, so that AT, is stationary. The resulting Phillips curve is then 
- 
could shift with structural changes in the economy 
expectation 
The NAIRU concept was first developed in a paper by Modigliani and Papa- 
demos (1975) and is defined as the rate of unemployment at which there is no 
tendency for  inflation  to  increase or  decrease. In  empirical work  such as 
Staiger et al. (1997a, 1997b) and Gordon (1997), NAIRU is viewed as being 
equivalent to the natural rate of unemployment,  ii,, in equation (1) and is typi- 
cally estimated by  assuming that ii, is a constant, a random walk, or a linear 
transformation of some step function or ~pline.~ 
For policy purposes, equation (1) indicates that it is perfectly appropriate to 
think about the unemployment gap, u, -  U,,  as one determinant of changes in 
the rate of inflation, recognizing that other factors, represented by the past his- 
tory of inflation and the z, variables, also affect the inflation process. However, 
current unemployment is frequently compared with  the estimated value of 
NAIRU, and the resulting NAIRU gap is taken to be an indicator of inflation- 
ary pressure. Under a strong form of this view, if policymakers wish to drive 
inflation down, they need  to raise the unemployment level above NAIRU, 
3. See, e.g.,  Staiger et al. (1997a). 409  Rethinking the Role of NAIRU in Monetary Policy 
whereas if inflation is at its desired level, monetary policy needs to keep unem- 
ployment from falling below NAIRU. 
Policy discussions, therefore, frequently focus on the difference between the 
current level of unemployment and NAIRU as estimated above, in other words, 
on the variable that enters the first term of  equation (1) in a distributed lag. 
This implicit comparison has the advantage of simplicity: it focuses the discus- 
sion on a single indicator of inflationary pressure, the unemployment gap, that 
we know from the model should be zero in long-run equilibrium. However, 
this advantage is overwhelmed by  a number of  serious problems associated 
with this procedure. 
First, monetary policy does not generally focus only on long-run equilib- 
rium, so the gap as defined above may be of limited usefulness. Second, even 
if  equation (I) is viewed as a short-run forecasting equation, the dependent 
variable is contemporaneous monthly or quarterly inflation, which is quite un- 
likely to be the policy target in practice. Third, the current unemployment gap 
is only one of  many explanatory variables in the equation, including several 
lags of the gap itself. Focusing on only one variable gives an incomplete pic- 
ture. Fourth, the equation may not even represent the optimal forecast of infla- 
tion, since other potentially important variables may be omitted. 
Finally, focusing on the unemployment gap may create the impression that 
the goal of policy is to drive unemployment toward NAIRU as a target level. 
As equation (1) illustrates, the current unemployment gap, u, -  Ur  is only one 
of many explanatory variables in the Phillips curve equation. The presence of 
lags of AT  in the equation suggests that inflation may decelerate because ex- 
pected inflation is falling, even if the unemployment rate is below the natural 
rate of unemployment. Similarly, if there have been favorable supply shocks, 
inflation in the future may decelerate even though the unemployment rate is 
well below the natural rate. The presence of lags of  the unemployment gap 
suggests complicated dynamics in which a current negative unemployment rate 
could also be associated with decelerating inflation. The presence of  many 
other variables besides the current unemployment gap in  the expectations- 
augmented Phillips curve equation therefore implies that the unemployment 
rate at which there is no tendency for inflation to rise or fall over the policy 
horizon can be quite different from the natural rate of  unemployment, H,. In 
other words, it can be quite misleading to focus on NAIRU, as an estimate in 
equation (1) of the natural rate of unemployment, because it is not clear that 
the introduction of policy shocks designed to drive unemployment toward this 
characterization of NAIRU will do anything to control inflation either in the 
short run or in the long run. 
Therefore, we propose an alternative way  of  thinking about NAIRU as a 
reference point for unemployment that reflects inflationary pressures over the 
short- or intermediate-run policy horizon. The key idea is that the reference 
point for unemployment at which inflation will neither increase nor decrease 
over  the  relevant policy  horizon, which  can be  thought of  as  a  short-run 410  Arturo Estrella and Frederic S. Mishkin 
NAIRU, embodies not only Et, the natural rate of unemployment, but also the 
other variables that help predict inflation. In other words, we would like to 
express the change in inflation over the relevant policy horizon as a function 
of u, -  n,, where n, is an appropriately constructed short-run NAIRU. 
Thus suppose that the policy horizon for inflation is from j to j  + k months 
aheadanddefine 
ATji.kj  = (1200/k) "g(pt+j+k'p,+j) - loo l0g(p,'pl-12) 
as the difference between current annual inflation and inflation over the policy 
horizon, where p,  is the price level in month t.  We then construct equation (2): 
(2) 
which is similar to equation (l),  save for the dependent variable and the inclu- 
sion of a vector x  that contains any predetermined variables that help predict 
inflation at the targeted h~rizon.~ 
In order to express the change in inflation as a function of the difference 
between unemployment and a short-run NAIRU, equation (2) can always be 
rewritten as 
=  a +  P(L)u, +  y(L)Av, +  S'x,  +  E,, 
(3)  AT:l.kj  =  Po(%  - n,) +  El 
with 
(4) 
n,  =  short-run NAIRU 
=  -[a + (P(L) - P(O>)u, +  Y(L)A.rr, +  6'x,I/P(O)9 
where all the predictive power of the equation has been subsumed in the short- 
run NAIRU n,. This short-run NAIRU is not an estimate of the long-run equi- 
librium natural rate, but a reference rate that represents the level of current 
unemployment that would correspond to a forecast of no inflation change over 
the policy h~rizon.~  Another important point that immediately falls out of this 
equation is that since short-run NAIRU is related to past lags of  unemploy- 
ment, inflation, and any other variables that help forecast changes in inflation, 
short-run NAIRU may undergo substantial fluctuations even if the natural rate 
of unemployment is a constant. 
Equation (3) has several important advantages over equation (1). In contrast 
4. The variable x  differs from z in the Gordon (1997) and Staiger et al. (1  997a, 1997bj  equations 
in that z represents primarily supply shocks that are contemporaneous with the dependent variable, 
whereas x  is more general in that it includes any predetermined variables other than unemployment 
and inflation (and their lags) that help predict future inflation. 
5. Eq. (4)  is a generalization of the model of short-run NAIRU in Estrella (1997). After writing 
this paper, we discovered that Layard and Bean (1988) also have a similar definition of short-run 
NAIRU in the context of a one-period change in inflation. 411  Rethinlung the Role of NAIRU in Monetary Policy 
to the conventional equation, the dependent variable in equation (3) is the 
change in inflation over the target horizon. Second, the current NAIRU gap, 
u, -  nt, is the only explanatory variable in the equation and it subsumes all 
the predictive power of the equation. Third, the equation provides an optimal 
forecast of targeted inflation, given current information. 
We note, however, that our approach to short-run NAIRU is fairly general 
and is largely independent of the particular form of equation (3).  The definition 
of short-run NAIRU in equation (4) simply collects all the systematic terms in 
equation (3),  other that the current rate of unemployment. Hence, this tech- 
nique is applicable to any forecasting equation for  as long as the current 
unemployment rate u, enters significantly in the equation.6 
The analysis of this paper will focus on equations (2)  and (3)  and on our 
corresponding definition of short-run NAIRU. For the purposes of theoretical 
analysis, we use a simplified version of these equations with a limited lag struc- 
ture. We return to the more general specification, however, when we consider 
empirical estimates using monthly data in section 9.6. 
9.3  The Role of NAIRU in Policy Making: 
The Certainty-Equivalent Case 
9.3.1  Objective Function with Inflation Only 
For the theoretical analysis, we start with a simple joint model of unemploy- 
ment and inflation that is isomorphic to the one employed by Svensson (1997) 
with an output gap. In addition to inflation IT  and an unemployment gap U,  the 
model contains an exogenous variable x  and a monetary policy control variable 
r. This model will be the basis for the next few sections of the paper. However, 
some specific assumptions will be adjusted in subsequent sections in order 
to address particular issues. Assume for the purposes of  this section that the 
parameters of the model are known with certainty. 
(5)  nt =  TI+l - ulGl+l  +  a,x,+, +  El  3 
(6)  L,  =  blG,-l  +  b2r1-1 +  b,x,_,  +  rl, > 
(7)  x,  =  C3Xr-, +  v,, 
where  u", = u, -  ii  and r, is the monetary policy variable. Equation (5) is a 
dynamic Phillips curve in which both unemployment and x are predictors of 
inflation one period ahead, say a year. Equation (6) is an IS curve, and equation 
(7) defines the dynamics of the exogenous variable x. The equilibrium level of 
6. In eq. (2), we think of  TI as an I( 1) process, which is consistent with current econometric 
evidence and practice. See, e.g., Stock (1991) and King and Watson (1994, sec. 4). Alternatively, 
one could think of  IT  as an I(0) process and include a level of  TI in the n-vector in eq. (2). 412  Arturo Estrella and Frederic S. Mishkin 
all the variables is zero. Note, therefore, that the policy variable r might be 
more similar to a change in the interest rate rather than the level. 
The reduced-form expression for inflation two periods ahead based on cur- 
rent values of the variables is 
(8) 
T,+,  =  T, - a,(l +  bl)Gt - a,b,r, 
+ [‘,(I  +  c3) - a,b,Ix, +  5r+2’ 
where 
ti+,  =  -‘l~i+l  +  ‘3’t+I  +  ‘r+1  +  ‘1+2’ 
Assume now that the policy objective is to minimize 
E,(n,+2 - ,*)2  = (E,nl+2 - n*)2  +  yrTl+2. 
Although this assumption seems simplistic, Svensson (1997) has shown that 
the solution obtained in this manner is equivalent to the dynamic solution of a 
model in which the target is a weighted sum of all future squared deviations 
of inflation from the target level. Note also that equation (8) is analogous to 
equation (2) above in that it corresponds to  an optimal forecast of  inflation 
acceleration over the policy horizon, which is given by 
E,T,+~  =  nt - ~,(l  +  bl)il  - a,b2rI  + [a,(l +  c3) - u,~,]x,. 
The conditional variance of inflation is 
ynl+2 =  u;. 
Since the variance of inflation does not depend on the policy variable, the result 
is determined by  certainty equivalence; that is, the optimal rule may be ob- 
tained by  setting expected inflation equal to the target, T*,  and solving for 
the value of  the policy variable. The optimal value of  the policy variable is 
given by 
where the short-run NAIRU (defined as a deviation from U)  is 
Equation (9) is a variant of the Taylor (1993) rule, which differs in that it is 
expressed in terms of unemployment rather than output. In addition, it allows 413  Rethinking the Role of NAIRU in Monetary Policy 
for the reference point for monetary tightening in terms of the level of unem- 
ployment to be a short-run NAIRU rather than a fixed natural rate. In effect 
what this variation on the Taylor rules does is bring in additional information 
that helps forecast inflation in deriving an optimal setting of the policy instru- 
ments. 
Even in this relatively simple setting, short-run NAIRU n, is not a constant 
but is instead a function of the exogenous variable x. If lags of inflation, unem- 
ployment, and the policy variable appear in equations (5) and (6), their role in 
the policy rule-and  therefore in the definition of short-run NAIRU-would 
be like that of x in the model. Of course, if the only variable that helps predict 
inflation over the policy horizon, other than the unemployment rate, is a con- 
stant, then NAIRU will be constant as in a more standard formulation. Note 
also that, like G,  the short-run NAIRU of  our theoretical model is measured in 
relation to U.  In empirical applications, we would want to focus on the equiva- 
lent of n, +  ti as a measure of short-run NAIRU. 
Equation (9) also helps to clarify the proper use of NAIRU for policy pur- 
poses. The policy objective is not to drive unemployment to NAIRU, which is 
a temporary and variable reference point, but to use the NAIRU unemployment 
gap as one indicator of the direction to move the policy variable, by an amount 
dictated by the coefficients of the model. Also, the NAIRU gap indicator is not 
to be interpreted in isolation but must be weighed against the effect on the 
optimal setting of the policy variable suggested by  the other indicator that is 
also included in the reaction function, the gap between actual and target in- 
flation. 
It is also important to recognize that our equation (9) variant of the Taylor 
rule is completely consistent with the result of Svensson (1997). Setting the 
policy instrument according to equation (9) is equivalent to setting expected 
inflation over the policy horizon equal to the inflation target IT*,  which is the 
Svensson (1997) optimality condition if only inflation is in the objective func- 
tion. 
We  can also draw some conclusions about the sign of the coefficient of x in 
the definition of NAIRU, based on whether x  represents a supply or a demand 
effect. For example, if x is a supply effect such as an oil price shock, then u3 
and b, would have the same sign. Since the other parameters in equation (10) 
were chosen to have positive values, the two terms in the coefficient would be 
offsetting and the net effect of x  on short-run NAIRU would be indeterminate. 
In contrast, if x represents a demand effect, then a, and b, would have opposite 
signs and the two terms would be reinforcing. The sign of the effect is positive 
if  the demand variable x  increases inflation and vice versa. In other words, a 
demand shock that raises inflation would lead to a higher value of  short-run 
NAIRU, which implies more tightening given the same value of  unemploy- 
ment. 
Supply and demand shocks also have differential effects on the overall im- 
plication about the optimal setting of  the policy variable. The cumulation of 414  Arturo Estrella and Frederic S. Mishkin 
supply effects would tend to drive both unemployment and inflation in the 
same direction, producing offsetting effects in equation (9). Cumulated de- 
mand effects, however, would drive inflation and unemployment in different 
directions, providing an unambiguous policy reaction. Therefore, demand ef- 
fects that raise inflation should provoke a policy tightening. 
9.3.2  Output as Well as Inflation in the Objective Function 
Even when inflation is the only concern of policymakers, as in subsection 
9.3.1,  the optimal policy assigns a significant role to the level of unemployment 
or to the unemployment gap, as seen in equation (9). In this section, we explore 
how policy should be conducted when policymakers include both inflation and 
output in their objectives. We do this by including a second term in the objec- 
tive function, which now becomes 
Et(~t+2  - IT*)'  +  XEti 
The economic significance of this change is that the policy objective assigns 
some weight to reducing the variability of unemployment around zero, which 
is the equilibrium level.' 
The optimal value of the policy variable in this case is 
+ [a,a,(l +  c3) - (a:+ X)b,]x, +  U](IT, - IT*)}. 
The modification of the objective function to reflect an unemployment target 
changes the weights on u, x,  and IT, -  IT*  in the optimal policy rule but does 
not affect its general form. Specifically, the weight on zZ,  relative to the weight 
on  IT^ -  IT*  rises with X. In the extreme, if the weight on unemployment be- 
comes infinitely large (X approaches infinity), the optimal rule simplifies to 
in which the inflation gap has disappeared and only an unemployment gap 
remains. This result may also be obtained by certainty equivalence, setting ex- 
pected unemployment equal to its equilibrium level and solving for the value 
of the policy variable. 
7. Once again, this is a relatively simple objective function designed to highlight the key points 
of this paper. A more complex dynamic solution of a similar model may be found in Svensson 
(1997), which exhibits properties that are qualitatively analogous to those of the simpler model of 
this paper. 415  Rethinking the Role of NAIRU in Monetary Policy 
9.4  NAIRU and Policy Making: 
Implications of Parameter Uncertainty 
9.4.1  Objective Function with Inflation Only 
Uncertainty about the Natural Rate of  Unemployment 
We  begin to examine the consequences of uncertainty in the model of sec- 
tion 9.3 by looking at the effects of uncertainty regarding the natural rate of 
unemployment or, equivalently, long-run NAIRU. We start with this particular 
question for two reasons. First, it seems that in the policy discussion on the 
use of NAIRU, it is this question that is most frequently in the mind of  the 
policymaker, although it is not always precisely formulated. Second, the exam- 
ination of  this narrower issue provides helpful intuition for the more general 
results that follow in the rest of this section. 
Thus consider a more focused version of the model of section 9.3 in which 
traditional long-run NAIRU is the appropriate reference point for monetary 
policy in terms of the unemployment rate: 
T,  =  T~-,  - a,(u,+, - i)  +  E, 
- T,-,  - a,u,-, +  a, +  E,, 
(54 
(64  u, - U  =  b,(u,_, - U) +  b,r,-, +  rl,, 
where a, = a,U and, as in section 9.3, U  is the natural rate and r,  is the monetary 
policy variable. We write these equations explicitly in terms of U in order to 
focus on uncertainty with regard to this parameter. For the same reason, we 
assume that the parameters b, and b, in equation (6a) are known. 
The second expression for equation (5a), under the natural stochastic as- 
sumptions, may be estimated using least squares. It is straightforward then to 
calculate the asymptotic distribution of  the parameter estimates, which are 
consistent. In particular, we can derive that T V(2,, i,),  the asymptotic variance 
of the vector of estimates (GI, 6,)  multiplied by the number of observations T, is 
- 
where cl and crf are the unconditional asymptotic mean and variance of  u, and 
cr%  is  the  variance  of  E,.  Now,  if  J  is  the Jacobian of  the transformation 
(a,,a,)  H  (a,,U) =  (a,,ao/al),  then  asymptotically  TV(i?,,G) =  TJ 
V(6,,  2,)J’,  which equals 
[.i:t  cr:7aJ 
where we have made use of the fact that the unconditional mean of equation 
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The foregoing derivations may  now be incorporated into the optimization 
problem of section 9.3, again with the objective function  E,(T,+~  -  IT*),, but now 
Ernr+, =  ",  - a,(l +  b,)(u, - ii) - a$,? 
and 
 IT,,^  =  a:,[(l +  b,)(-u, +  U)  - b,rr12 +  a:(l +  b,)*a; 
+ af,a:.(l  +  b,)Z  +  a;. 
In the expression  for the variance, the terms that include a:  do not depend on the 
policy variable. Since the estimators of ii and a,  are orthogonal,  the optimal rule 
will not depend on the uncertainty with regard to ii, as shown in the expression 
where T, = a,/a,,. 
Thus uncertainty about the natural rate, in and of itself, does not affect the 
solution to the policymaker's optimization problem, as defined in this section 
and in  section 9.3. However, the uncertainty about the natural rate does in- 
crease the cost function because, as seen above, it increases the conditional 
variance of T,,~.  The uncertainty about the parameter a,, the effect on inflation 
acceleration of the gap between unemployment and the natural rate, does figure 
in the optimal policy through the term (1 + T;~)-,, which is a essentially a 
function of  the t-statistic on a,. Its effect, however, is not on the term con- 
taining the unemployment gap, but rather on the term containing the gap be- 
tween current and target inflation. The greater the uncertainty about a,, the 
lower 7,  and therefore (1 + 7r2)-', so the less weight the policymaker should 
place on the current inflation gap. This result is very robust, as it obtains in the 
models of  subsequent sections, in which we introduce more complex specifi- 
cations with fairly general parameter uncertainty. 
General Parameter Uncertainty 
Consider again the model defined by equations (5),  (6),  and (7) of subsection 
9.3.1, but assume now that there is uncertainty at time t about all the coeffi- 
cients of the model (a,,  a,, b,,  b,, b,, c,) and about the disturbance of  the re- 
duced form (c), but that the uncertainty in all of  these variables is pairwise 
orthogonal. Although these uncertainty assumptions are not entirely general- 
on account of the assumed orthogonality-they  are more extensive than those 
that the previous literature has examined.*  The orthogonality assumptions are 
8. Other papers that look at the effect of parameter uncertainty in a similar context are Svensson 
(1997), Clarida, Gal:,  and Gertler (forthcoming), and Wieland (1998). 417  Rethinking the Role of NAIRU in Monetary Policy 
easily relaxed for coefficients belonging to the same equation, but the inclusion 
of  the corresponding covariances does not provide greater intuition and  is 
therefore not pursued here. Thus, at time t,  the expectation and variance of in- 
flation at time t + 2 are given by 
E,T~,+’ =  - a,(l +  b,)ii, - a,b2rI  + [a,(l +  c,) - u,~,]x, 
and 
y~r,,’ = [a~a~,  + ui,(1  + b,)’ + uf,u~,]ii~  + (a~u~,  + uf,b: + u:,ui2)r: 
+ [a:U,2, + ua,(l + c3)2  + Ut3U,2, + a:“:,  + up:  + u~,u~,lX: 
+ 2ufl[(1  + bl)b2iirrt  + b,b,r,x, + (1 + b,)b,ii,x,l  + u2, 
where the values of the coefficients denote their expected  value^.^ 
the objective function 
As in subsection 9.3.1,  the policy objective is to choose r, so as to minimize 
E,(IT,+’ - IT*)’  = (E,T~~+~  - T*)’  +   IT,+^. 
In this case, the optimal value of the policy variable is given by 
- 
+ 
where ‘T,  = ul/ual  and ‘T~  = b2/ub2.  Equation (1  1) can be rewritten as 
where 
9. This convention economizes on notation and is correct by definition if the coefficient esti- 
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Comparison of equations (9) and (12) indicates that the presence of uncer- 
tainty introduces two multiplicative terms of the form (1 +  T;~)-~.  These terms 
are essentially functions of the t-statistics corresponding to the parameters a, 
and b,,  respectively, which correspond to the one-period-ahead effects of un- 
employment on inflation and of the policy variable on unemployment. All other 
variance-related terms in the objective function drop out of  the calculation. 
When there is no uncertainty about a, and b,,  the two multiplicative terms 
become one, reverting to the certainty-equivalent case of subsection 9.3.1. 
One of the two uncertainty effects-the  one related to b,, the coefficient on 
the policy variable in equation (6)-takes  a form that is predictable from the 
analysis by Brainard (1967). Specifically, as ubZ  rises, the term (1 + T;')-'  falls 
so that uncertainty about the magnitude of  the effect of  the policy variable 
leads to  a partial policy  reaction-a  reaction that is less than  that  in  the 
certainty-equivalent case. 
In contrast, uncertainty about a,, the effect of unemployment on the change 
in inflation in equation (5),  has an effect not on the scale of the policy reaction, 
but rather on the weight applied to IT, -  IT* and on the reference point in terms 
of unemployment at which that reaction occurs. Specifically, as an,  rises, the 
term (1 + T;~)-' falls so that the weight on IT, -  IT* falls. A rise in ua,  causes 
the term (1 + T;)-,  and the absolute value of the adjustment term +r  to rise. If 
x  has a positive impact on inflation (i.e., a,x,  is positive), then 4, is negative 
and so the reference point for monetary tightening in terms of unemployment, 
n, + +,, falls. 
The effect of  uncertainty about a, on how the reference point responds to 
change in x  is somewhat more complex. The net effect on the reference point 
n, + 4, depends on whether x is a supply or demand variable, as discussed in 
subsection 9.3.1. Consider the combined expression 
xt .  1 +  T;*  a,(l +  b,)  1 +  b, 
If x is a supply variable, the direction of the effect of uncertainty on the magni- 
tude of the reference point is unclear. It is clear, however, that as uncertainty 
about a, approaches infinity, the sign of the coefficient is the same as the sign 
of  -b3. If x  is a demand variable, uncertainty reduces the absolute magnitude 
of the reference point unambiguously. 
9.4.2  Output as Well as Inflation in the Objective Function 
We  now modify the results of the previous subsection by assuming that the 
policy objective function includes both inflation and unemployment. As in sub- 
section 9.3.2, the objective function becomes 
E,(IT,,~  - IT*)*  +  kEti:+, 
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b2 
A  ’r- 
a:+  ua, + 
The effect of including a target for unemployment, as represented by  A, is 
analogous to the effect of  uncertainty about a,. In the above equation, these 
two terms occur additively in the same expression in the terms corresponding 
to the exogenous variable and the inflation gap. Only in the unemployment 
term does A appear separately. Intuitively, the reason for this is that uncertainty 
about a, makes the relationship expressed in equation (5) less reliable, so pol- 
icy becomes more concerned with affecting the “intermediate target” of equi- 
librium unemployment. 
If  the weight on unemployment becomes infinitely large, the optimal rule 
simplifies to 
b 
-  1  rCmJ  - 
72  1 +  7;2(  1 
in which, as in the certainty-equivalent case, the inflation gap has disappeared 
and only an unemployment gap remains. Here the only effect of uncertainty is 
of the rescaling type, as identified by Brainard (1967). 
9.5  NAIRU and Policy Making: The Implications of Model Selection 
In this section, we discuss another type of uncertainty that affects the defini- 
tion of short-run NAIRU, its computation, and the policy rule that results from 
inflation targeting. Specifically, we focus on uncertainty regarding the correct 
form  of  the  basic  model  and  the  associated problem  of  model  selection. 
Whereas in section 9.4 we  assumed that the form of  the model was  known 
but that the parameters were estimated with uncertainty, we now suppose that 
the policymaker ignores some key  information variable in the optimization 
problern.I0 
In general, if inflation two periods ahead is the policy target, and if a variable 
helps predict inflation at that horizon, it is inefficient not to include the infor- 
mation in the model. For example, the models of sections 9.3 and 9.4 define 
the policy rule in terms of a short-run NAIRU, which in turn is a function of 
the exogenous variable x. What is the result of ignoring the predictive content 
10. The complementary problem of  including too many variables in the model is in principle 
less serious, since consistent parameter estimates should assign zero weight to the superfluous 
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of  x?  Alternatively, what  is the cost of  relying  on  a long-run equilibrium 
NAIRU (zero in this case) when a short-run informative NAIRU is available? 
Thus suppose that the policymaker ignores the presence of x in the basic 
model (5)-(7). The values of  a3 and b, are implicitly set to zero, while the 
third equation is dropped altogether. Under these conditions, the constrained 
optimal rule for inflation targeting becomes 
We  know, of  course, that the value of  the objective function has to be higher 
(i.e., worse) when evaluated at this constrained optimum than when evaluated 
at the unconstrained optimum r,! as in subsection 9.4.1. In fact, we can calcu- 
late the difference between the constrained and unconstrained values as 
Somewhat surprisingly, uncertainty about b, ameliorates the left-out-variable 
problem." Uncertainty about a,, in contrast, can make matters worse. 
The left-out-variable problem can also increase uncertainty regarding the 
estimates of  the included coefficients, with consequences for the size of  the 
policy response or the reference point for monetary tightening in terms of un- 
employment. To  see this, suppose the inflation equation (5) is estimated by 
ordinary least squares, leaving out the variable x, after rewriting it in the fol- 
lowing form 
(5')  Tr* -  = -a,ii-,  +  E,. 
One implication of leaving out x, well known from econometrics textbooks, is 
that the estimate of a, may be biased. This occurs unless x  and u are contempo- 
raneously uncorrelated.'* However, even if the two regressors are indeed un- 
correlated so that the estimate of a, is unbiased, uncertainty in the estimate is 
greater by the amount 
ZIT:  RZ-  R: 
c,  ii  n 
~. 
where the numerator of  the last term is the difference between the R2s of  the 
unconstrained and constrained models. Thus excluding the variable x  from the 
model, in addition to producing a policy rule that improperly excludes x, in- 
11. The intuition is that as uncertainty about b, grows, the optimal response of the policy vari- 
12. See, e.g., Theil (1971, sec. 11.2).  This problem may be bypassed formally by  thinking of n 
able r is reduced so that there is less loss from using the incorrect model. 
as the component of the additional variable that is uncorrelated with u. 421  Rethinking the Role of NAIRU in Monetary Policy 
creases uncertainty about a,. One possible consequence is that, for the reasons 
provided in section 9.4, the policymaker may react to the higher level of ual  by 
adjusting the weight on T~ -  T* downward and by increasing the absolute size 
of the NAIRU adjustment +,. 
9.6  Empirical Estimates of Short-Run NAIRU 
9.6.1  Empirical Evidence on the Importance of Uncertainty 
Although our theoretical framework shows qualitatively the effects of uncer- 
tainty on how monetary policy should be conducted, it cannot tell us whether 
these effects are economically important. To examine this question, we esti- 
mate in this section a simple NAIRU gap model for the United States to obtain 
measures of uncertainty and to assess how these measures affect our view of 
the optimal reaction of monetary policy to movements in unemployment rela- 
tive to short-run NAIRU. In order to have in the model a simple lag structure 
that mimics that of  the theoretical model (5)-(7),  we  start  by  estimating a 
model with annual U.S. data over the period 1956-96. The model is 
(13)  TI - TZ-] =  + -a,u,-,  +  azul-z  +  E,, 
where T is the log change in the CPI from December of year t -  1 to December 
of year t,  u is the unemployment rate in December of year t,  and r is the average 
monthly three-month Treasury bill rate during year t.  Note that a1  and P, corre- 
spond to a, and b, in the theoretical model, and that the key uncertainty ratios 
T;~  and T;~  will be based on the former. The results are presented in table 9.1. 
These estimates provide some guidelines regarding the importance of uncer- 
tainty for monetary policy in this context. First, the adjustments to the unem- 
ployment reference point and to the policy reaction as a result of  parameter 
Table 9.1  Estimates of Annual U.S. Model, 1956-96 
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Table 9.2  Implicit Interest Rate Rules 
Rule 
Weight on Lagged  Inflation  Unemployment 
Interest Rate  Gap  or Output Gap 
Unadjusted 
Annual  .71 
Quarterly  .94 
With output gap  .94 
Uncertainty adjusted 
Annual  .ll 
Quarterly  .94 
With output gap  .94 
1.70  -2.56 
.41  -.70 
.41  .35 
1.59  -2.49 
.44  -  .69 
.44  .34 
uncertainty are not large. The key parameters are estimated with some pre- 
cision, and the implied multiplicative adjustment factors are both  close to 
one. The Brainard-type adjustment-a  2.5 percent reduction-is  particularly 
small, suggesting that the magnitude of  the policy reaction should only be 
shaded down slightly to reflect parameter uncertainty. However, the unemploy- 
ment effect adjustment is also less than 5 percent. 
These results are confirmed by  looking at the implicit optimal policy that 
corresponds to the two-year-ahead inflation target of the theoretical model in 
which only inflation is included in the objective function. The rule that results 
is very similar to the simple Taylor (1993) rule when adjustments are made for 
the fact that Taylor's rule was defined in terms of quarterly data and an output 
gap. The annual and quarterly results are presented in table 9.2. If  6 is the 
weight on the lagged interest rate in the annual model, the corresponding quar- 
terly lag is assigned a weight of W4  and the weights on the inflation and unem- 
ployment gaps are divided by  1 + 6'14 + tiu4  + Ei314. A rule based on the output 
gap is obtained by  applying a simple Okun's law adjustment, dividing the un- 
employment weight by 2. 
The table confirms that the practical significance of parameter uncertainty 
is quite small. Furthermore, the quarterly results with the output gap are re- 
markably similar, even numerically, to the parameters suggested by  Taylor 
(1993). The only key difference is that the interest rate is assumed to be much 
more persistent here, since Taylor did not include a lagged interest rate in the 
form of his 1zl1e.l~ 
9.6.2  Empirical Estimates of Short-Run NAIRU 
In this subsection, we present estimates of short-run NAIRU. For these pur- 
poses, we return to the more general model (2)-(4)  and estimate the equations 
with monthly data from January 1954 to November 1997, using a 12-month- 
13. Recent estimates of  the Taylor rule by  Rudebusch and Svensson (chap. 5 of  this volume) 
and Rotemberg and Woodford (chap. 2), among others, suggest that the persistence parameter is 







































































































































 424  Arturo Estrella and Frederic S. Mishkin 
Staiger et al. (1997a) have pointed out that such estimates of a constant long- 
run NAIRU tend to be quite imprecise. Using the delta method in an equation 
similar to (1 ’), they obtain an  estimate of ti = 6.2 percent, with a standard error 
of about 0.6. Our estimate of U = 6.1 has a standard error of 0.43, which is 
somewhat smaller-perhaps  partly because of  our larger sample-but  is of 
the same  order of magnitude. Estimates of short-run NAIRU n,  are more precise. 
The standard error of n,  is a time-varying function of the values of the variables 
in expression (4). Over the sample period, the standard errors range from 0.11 
to 0.42, with a mean of 0.20, less than half of the standard error of 
Thus short-run NAIRU is estimated with more than twice the precision than 
standard long-run NAIRU. The practical significance of this result, however, 
is limited, since we have shown in the theoretical sections that this type of 
uncertainty plays no role in the determination of the policy rule. Nevertheless, 
a reduction in the uncertainty may produce a reduction in the value of the cost 
function, as shown in section 9.5, even if the policy rule remains unaltered. 
9.6.3  A Case Study: Recent Signals from a Short-Run NAIRU 
Using the estimates of the NAIRU gap from subsection 9.6.2,  we now exam- 
ine the hypothetical results of using the methodology of this paper in the con- 
duct of monetary policy in the United States since June 1992, when the un- 
employment rate began  a prolonged  decline. The results will of  course be 
somewhat simplistic, but they may provide some general support for the con- 
cepts developed in this paper. 
If  we refer to one of the policy rules in the theoretical part of the paper, say 
to equation (9), we note that the appropriate interest rate is determined es- 
sentially by  two gaps: the difference between  unemployment  and short-run 
NAIRU and the difference between actual and target inflation. We present in 
figure 9.2a the gap between short-run NAIRU and unemployment (signed so 
that a positive value indicates that monetary policy should be tightened) and 
the level of inflation (12 previous months) since 1992. 
From June 1992 to the end of  1993, declining unemployment brought the 
NAIRU gap from levels suggesting, if anything, the need for ease to relatively 
neutral levels. Meanwhile, inflation declined over the period and, in fact, con- 
tinued to decline into the beginning of 1994. Beginning in 1994, however, the 
NAIRU gap became positive and remained so until early 1995, suggesting a 
need for tightening. In addition, inflation stopped declining, remaining around 
the 3 percent level. These two factors combined are consistent with the mone- 
tary tightening undertaken by the Federal Reserve throughout  1994 and into 
early 1995. 
Since then, the NAIRU gap has indicated some pressure to tighten twice, in 
1996 and 1997. In the first case, the pressure from the NAIRU gap was accom- 
15. All our standard errors are estimated consistently using the Newey-West technique with a 
24-lag window (Newey and West 1987). 425  Rethinking the Role of NAIRU in Monetary Policy 
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hand scale), June 1992 to November 1997 
NAIRU gap (solid line, left-hand scale) and inflation (dashed line, right- 
panied by a rise in inflation. Even though inflation subsided toward the end of 
the year, this episode may  seem somewhat inconsistent with the absence of 
further tightening. Figure 9.2b suggests one reason for this result. Figure 9.2b 
presents the results of repeating the analysis of figure 9.2a, but using core in- 
flation (excluding food and energy prices) instead of total inflation. Core infla- 
tion tends to be a better signal of persistent changes in inflation than total in- 
flation. 
Figure 9.2b shows both the level of core inflation as well as the gap between 
unemployment and short-run NAIRU computed using core inflation in equa- 
tions (2), (3),  and (4). Comparisons  of  the two panels of  figure 9.2 suggests 
that the effect of using core inflation in the calculation of the NAIRU gap is 
very  slight. But core inflation  was falling in  1996, in contrast to the rising 
total inflation, and this  fall may have offset the tightening  signals from the 
NAIRU gap. 
In 1997, the pressure arising from the unemployment gap seemed stronger 426  Arturo Estrella and Frederic S. Mishkin 
than in the previous year. Inflation, however, both total and core, moved down- 
ward again, offsetting at least partially the signals from the NAIRU gap indica- 
tor. Arguably, only during 1994 and early 1995 were there consistent signals 
for tightening, and this is when the Federal Reserve engaged in most of  its 
monetary tightening. 
In order to evaluate the net effect of the unemployment and inflation indica- 
tors, it would be helpful to summarize the information in a single measure, as 
in the policy rules of table 9.2. We  would like to do this, not to explain actual 
policy, but to suggest how the theoretical constructs of this paper could be used 
in practice. However, this is a problem for two reasons. First, we would have 
to construct a full optimization model in the context of  the monthly equations, 
which is beyond the scope of the present paper.16 Second, we would have to 
know or make an assumption about the target level of inflation. Thus we pre- 
sent only a limited version of  a policy rule in which we deal with those prob- 
lems as follows. 
First, we take the weights for the NAIRU and inflation gaps from the annual 
results of  table 9.2 allowing for uncertainty, making allowance also for the 
monthly frequency of our data. Since the coefficient of the lagged interest rate, 
8’”*  = 0.98, is very close to one, we further simplify by  assuming that the 
weights are used to calculate a monthly change in the interest rate. We  then 
divide the annual weights by  1 + 81’12  + ... + 8L1’12  to obtain weights of -0.23 
for the NAIRU gap and 0.15 for the inflation gap with total inflation and -0.25 
and 0.19, respectively, using core inflati0n.l’ To deal with the second problem, 
the fact that the inflation target is unknown, we  scale the results so that the 
policy rule with total inflation is neutral, on average, over the period since June 
1992.  This assumption is equivalent to an inflation target of 3 percent. 
The results are presented as the solid lines in the two panels of  figure 9.3. 
Note that the weighted results are consistent with our earlier discussion of the 
individual components. In panel 9.3a, which contains the results using the total 
CPI, the strongest signal for tightening comes during 1994. Note also, how- 
ever, that there were distinct signals for tightening in 1992-93 and 1996-97, 
and that there were fairly strong signals for easing at the beginning and toward 
the end of the sample period. In panel 9.3b, which contains results using the 
core CPI, there are also strong signals to tighten in 1994, but because the core 
inflation rate was higher than total CPI in late 1992 and early 1993, there are 
also strong signals to tighten in this period. In contrast to panel 9.3a, the results 
with the core CPI do not suggest any need to tighten in 1996. 
16. A model along those lines has been developed for the United States in Clarida et al. (forth- 
coming). See also the references in that paper. 
17. Adjusting fully for coefficient uncertainty would require, in addition to the adjusted weights, 
an adjustment to short-run NAIRU corresponding to the term +, defined in subsection 9.4.1.  We 
do not make this adjustment here because our equation for monthly NAIRU is essentially a re- 
duced form and the components are difficult to disentangle, and also because the coefficient of the 
adjustment factor (1 +  <)-I  5  0.065 is empirically small. 427  Rethinking the Role of NAIRU in Monetary Policy 
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Fig. 9.3  Simple policy rules based on short-run NAIRU (solid line) and long- 
run NAIRU (dashed line), June 1992 to November 1997 
We may contrast these results with a rule based on the standard unemploy- 
ment gap-the  gap between unemployment and a constant long-run NAIRU. 
The results are presented as the dashed lines in the two panels of figure 9.3. To 
obtain weights that are consistent with the assumption of a constant NAIRU, 
we estimated equations (13) and (14) without the second lag of unemployment, 
which produces an estimate of NAIRU that is constant. These new weights are 
-0.35  for the NAIRU gap and 0.34 for the inflation gap using total inflation 
and -0.36  and 0.37, respectively, using core inflation. Note, however, that if 
we use the same weights as before, the qualitative results are the same as with 
these weights. 
The results  for the long-run NAIRU gap, which are driven by  the large 
steady decline in unemployment over this period, are fairly robust. The main 
feature of the alternative rule is that it argues for easing throughout the first 
part of the period, and then for tightening throughout the second part of the 
period. What this rule misses is that a long-run  natural rate is not the best 428  Arturo Estrella and Frederic S. Mishkin 
reference point for unemployment  if the goal is to target inflation in the short 
run. 
9.7  Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine how a variant of the NAIRU concept can be use- 
fully employed in the conduct of monetary policy. By thinking of NAIRU in 
this way, we obtain insights that might be quite useful to monetary policymak- 
ers. Because there are quite a few results sprinkled throughout the paper, we 
list the main ones here. 
The NAIRU concept that is useful for the conduct of monetary policy differs 
from the estimate of the natural rate of unemployment, the long-run concept 
used previously by many researchers.  Instead, NAIRU can be viewed as a 
short-run construct,  which  is related to past  levels of  unemployment  and 
inflation as well as other economic variables, that helps forecast future accel- 
erations or decelerations of inflation. 
Short-run NAIRU should be viewed, not as a target for policy, but as an aid 
in defining the reference point that policymakers can compare to the current 
rate of unemployment to derive a signal for the appropriate stance of policy. 
Furthermore, as long as inflation is an element in the policymakers’ objective 
function, the NAIRU gap is not the only signal that should affect the setting 
of policy instruments: the deviation of inflation from its target level also has 
an important role in the determination of the appropriate stance of policy. 
The policy rule that comes out of our analysis is a variant of a Taylor rule 
using an unemployment gap rather than an output gap, but it has one major 
difference from more standard formulations. The standard Taylor rule im- 
plicitly assumes that the reference point to which unemployment should be 
compared in the unemployment gap term is constant, while in our formula- 
tion, the reference point is related to short-run NAIRU, which can have sub- 
stantial short-run fluctuations over time. 
Uncertainty  about the level of NAIRU has no influence on the setting of 
policy instruments,  although it does affect the value of the objective func- 
tion. This type of uncertainty makes the economy worse off but does not al- 
ter policy behavior. 
Uncertainty about the effect of unemployment on inflation leads to an addi- 
tive adjustment to short-run NAIRU to calculate the reference point for mon- 
etary tightening in terms of the level of  unemployment. In addition, uncer- 
tainty about the unemployment effect on inflation changes the weight on the 
inflation gap in the policy rule. 
Uncertainty  about the effect of the policy variable leads to a scaling down 
of the reaction of the policy variable, the well-known Brainard (1967)  result. 
Uncertainty about model selection can have important effects on the form of 
the policy  rule. In particular,  if  a constant  NAIRU is used-as  occurs if 429  Rethinking the Role of NAIRU in Monetary Policy 
NAIRU is viewed as a long-run concept-so  that information about the state 
of the economy that could be used to forecast inflation is ignored, the perfor- 
mance of the policy rule can be substantially worse. In addition, leaving out 
relevant variables that help forecast inflation increases the uncertainty about 
the effect of unemployment on inflation, with the resulting implications de- 
scribed above. 
Although parameter uncertainty has potentially large effects on how policy 
should be conducted, our empirical results suggest that parameter  uncer- 
tainty may not be all that important for the setting of policy. We find some 
evidence of changes in the policy rule resulting from the parameter uncer- 
tainty we explored in our theoretical model, but these effects are very mod- 
est. They affect the weights in the policy rule by less than 5 percent in both 
the case of uncertainty about the impact of unemployment and the case of 
uncertainty about the effect of the policy variable. 
Estimates of short-run NAIRU are highly variable over time. However, there 
is a fair degree of precision in these estimates. 
Substantial positive NAIRU gap estimates arose throughout  1994 and early 
1995 and in parts of  1996 and  1997. However, core inflation was substan- 
tially lower in 1996 and 1997 than in 1994. Thus the one period since June 
1992 during which there were consistent signals for tightening occurred dur- 
ing  1994 and early  1995, which  is when the Fed engaged in most of  its 
monetary tightening. 
These results suggest that a short-run NAIRU is indeed a useful concept and 
that it can be used by policymakers, particularly  in deciding how monetary 
policy should be conducted. However, there are some subtle issues in how the 
short-run NAIRU concept might be used correctly. First, because our view of 
NAIRU sees it as a short-run construct, it is dangerous to think of NAIRU as 
a potential target for unemployment that stays around a particular value, such 
as 6 percent, for any period of time. Second, deviation of inflation from its 
target is every bit as important a factor in thinking about setting policy as is 
the NAIRU gap. Third, uncertainty about parameter values and model selec- 
tion does have effects on the optimal setting of policy instruments but does not 
appear to be a bamer to a useful role for the NAIRU concept in policy deci- 
sions. 
We hope that this paper helps resurrect NAIRU as a useful concept, but only 
if it is used properly. As we have shown, a short-run NAIRU is a useful con- 
struct because it helps tell policymakers what might happen to inflation in the 
future. Furthermore, the model of this paper suggests that policymakers may 
want to avoid the impression that an objective of policy is to raise unemploy- 
ment when it falls below NAIRU or to lower it when it is above NAIRU. To 
view policy in this way might lead the public to think that policymakers are 
against low unemployment, an outcome that can reduce support for central 
bank efforts to control inflation. 430  Arturo Estrella and Frederic S. Mishkin 
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Comment  Robert E. Hall 
Reading Estrella and Mishkin’s paper made me aware for the first time of the 
difference in the use of the term NAIRU between academics and practitioners. 
As an academic out of touch with the parlance of  central bankers, I thought 
that the NAIRU was the unemployment rate such that there is no pressure on 
inflation from the labor market. In my mind, the NAIRU was effectively an- 
other name for the natural rate of unemployment. I learned from this paper 
that-in  circles closer to the real world-the  NAIRU is the unemployment 
rate such that pressure from the labor market is sufficient to offset supply 
shocks or other transitory sources of  inflation. The NAIRU, in those circles, 
would be the target unemployment rate for a monetary policy that sought to 
stabilize the inflation rate period by period. Alternatively, as this paper shows, 
the NAIRU is an element in a monetary policy that rolls with the punches and 
permits some variation in inflation in the shorter run because there is value in 
stabilizing real activity as well as inflation. 
I will start with some comments on equation (1  ’), the framework for estimat- 
ing the natural rate. These comments also apply to the related work by Staiger, 
Stock, and Watson (1997). The idea of this research is expressed in the follow- 
ing equation: 
ITr  =  ci - put +  y(L)Tr-,  +  E,. 
My  notation is the same as the paper’s. The natural rate U is defined as the 
value of u such that the inflation rate stays at the constant level T.  It is 




Here y( 1)  is the sum of the coefficients on lagged inflation in the Phillips curve. 
To interpret this equation, we need to go back to the very dawn of the ratio- 
nal expectations era. Prior to Milton Friedman’s (1968) American Economic 
Association presidential address, this equation was seen as describing a long- 
run trade-off between inflation and unemployment. If  y( 1) < 1, the trade-off 
is positive. Friedman made a broad argument from first principles that there 
could not be a long-run trade-off; rather, the unemployment rate would tend to 
the natural rate, invariant under inflation in the longer run. There followed a 
brief period of research based on the mistaken belief that Friedman’s hypothe- 
sis could be tested by  estimating y(L)  and testing the hypothesis y(1) = 1. 
Then Sargent (1971) straightened the subject out by observing that the coeffi- 
cients y(L)  depend on the nature of monetary policy. If  policy makes inflation 
return to a normal level by offsetting movements away from that level, then 
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y( 1) < 1 even if Friedman is right-as  we all now agree-that  unemployment 
is invariant in the long run to the choice of inflation target. 
Estrella and Mishkin are unwilling to face up to Sargent’s point. Despite the 
emphasis I gave at the conference to this point, they have not altered this part 
of  the paper and do not cite Sargent, who was present at the conference and 
agreed that this paper fell into the trap he identified in 197  1. 
From equation (l),  it is apparent that U  is not identified as a general matter 
by  the equation. There are two possible identifying hypotheses. First, if  the 
long-run rate of inflation, T,  is known and is truly constant over time, then the 
other coefficients in equation (1) can be estimated by  standard methods and 
the equation solved for U.  Second, one could assume that y( 1) = 1. The authors 
do the second. I do not believe that this assumption makes sense, especially 
for data starting after the rationalization of monetary policy in 1979. 
We  normally view the coefficients y(L) as a description of  expectations 
about inflation. The Phillips curve relates unexpected inflation to the unem- 
ployment rate. Under that interpretation, the coefficients y(L)  sum to one if 
inflation does not revert to some mean value but is an integrated process. But 
one feature of monetary policy agreed upon by every commentator is that pol- 
icy should always induce mean reversion in inflation. The debates in monetary 
policy are over the speed of  the mean reversion, and also over whether we 
should induce mean reversion in the price level. In the latter case, mean rever- 
sion in the inflation rate occurs automatically. And, at least since 1979, there 
seems little doubt that policy has tried and succeeded in making inflation mean 
reverting. Any hint of an upsurge in inflation results in the Fed’s stepping on 
the brake to bring inflation back to target. 
A second reason to expect mean reversion in the rate of  inflation is that 
the main source of  price disturbances-movements  in the price of  oil-are 
temporary. Even without good monetary policy, bursts of  inflation are tem- 
porary. 
Although simple tests of mean reversion of inflation support the hypothesis, 
I learned at the conference from the master of this craft-James  Stock-that 
one cannot reject the hypothesis of no mean reversion. That gives Estrella and 
Mishkin some support. But my impression is that the test is not very powerful. 
Someone like myself, a Bayesian in such matters, can follow his prior and 
believe that y(1) is well below one. As a result, I do not find the empirical 
results in this paper, based on the fundamental identifying hypothesis y(  1) = 
1, to be informative. 
A second factor also inhibits this type of  empirical research. Suppose that 
the Fed determines policy by  minimizing the expected value of  the squared 
deviation of inflation from target. To do so, it sets the current values of  vari- 
ables it controls, such as the unemployment rate, in such a way  as to make 
them uncorrelated with the future inflation deviation. In such a world, a re- 
searcher running Phillips curve regressions would find a completely flat rela- 433  Rethinking the Role of NAIRU in Monetary Policy 
tion between unemployment and inflation. It is well known that optimization 
can completely conceal structural relationships. 
The fact that Estrella and Mishkin’s Phillips curve slopes downward and is 
not completely flat shows that the Fed is not pursuing a policy that conceals 
the slope. But the problem still lurks in the background. To the extent that there 
is purposeful policy, the slope of the Phillips curve obtained by regression is 
biased, and the value of the natural rate is correspondingly biased. In general, 
I think the paper neglects identification issues in a pretty serious way. 
There is a robust estimator of the natural rate available, but it is not discussed 
in the paper. As Friedman pointed, the unemployment rate fluctuates around 
the natural rate irrespective of the monetary regime. Hence, the average value 
of  the unemployment rate is a good estimate of the natural rate. No further 
identifying hypotheses are needed. Two estimates based on this method are 
6.08 (0.51) for 1960-96  and 6.05 (0.30) for 1983-96. The standard errors are 
based on an AR(2) error process. These results are quite similar to Estrella and 
Mishkin’s, though the standard errors are larger. Of course, a finding that the 
natural rate is over 6 percent only deepens the mystery of low inflation in 1998, 
with an unemployment rate almost 2 percentage points lower than the natural 
rate. 
To summarize in this area, I believe that Estrella and Mishkin neglect identi- 
fication issues but nonetheless find reasonable values of the natural rate. But I 
think that they seriously understate the sampling variation in their estimates. I 
do not believe that we know the natural rate at any particular time with a preci- 
sion of a few tenths of a percentage point, as they claim. 
The paper pays a lot of  attention to uncertainty. It uses the framework of 
quadratic preferences, which is a reasonable starting point. But decision mak- 
ers with quadratic preferences do not behave in a precautionary way. There are 
no  catastrophes in the way  that a quadratic decision maker views alternative 
random outcomes. For example, a consumer with quadratic preferences does 
not have marginal utility rising to infinity as consumption approaches zero. 
Instead, marginal utility is finite at zero consumption. Consequently, quadratic 
decision makers do not take special precautions to avoid situations like zero 
consumption or 20 percent inflation. An early next step in the research should 
be the exploration of behavior under more realistic preferences, such as con- 
stant relative risk aversion. 
In  particular, Brainards (1967) point that uncertainty about the slopes of 
structural relations makes decision makers more timid is firmly rooted in qua- 
dratic preferences. Decision makers who are anxious to avoid catastrophic 
outcomes may need to take aggressive action in the presence of  slope uncer- 
tainties. I believe the special features of Brainards analysis are inadequately 
appreciated. 
The paper’s findings, in table 9.2, of small adjustments for parameter uncer- 
tainty need to be accompanied by  two warnings. First, as I just noted, they 434  Arturo Estrella and Frederic S. Mishkin 
are special to quadratic preferences; precautionary decision making would be 
different. Second, I think the paper understates the actual amount of parameter 
uncertainty.  Its lack of concern with identification and corresponding use of 
least squares almost automatically causes it to understate sampling variation. 
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Discussion Summary 
Donald  Kohn never heard NAIRU discussed  as a target  at a Federal Open 
Market Committee meeting, as implied in the paper, but rather as an input into 
an inflation  forecast.  Moreover,  those inflation forecasts take account of  a 
wider variety of factors affecting prices and therefore already embody the fact 
that the unemployment rate could differ from its long-run natural rate for quite 
some time and still be consistent with steady inflation. 
Laurence Bull expressed confusion about the empirical results in the paper, 
especially about figure 9.1. NAIRU seems to be very close to actual unemploy- 
ment. For example, the unemployment rate in 1982 consistent with stable in- 
flation was about 10  percent. The actual unemployment rate in 1982 was about 
10.5 percent, so for the difference between these two rates to matter, it must 
be multiplied by a huge multiplier. Bob Hull agreed that figure 9.1 was very 
confusing. 
Laurence Meyer remarked  that  tightness  in the labor market and supply 
shocks should not be put into a single variable. Since supply shocks are often 
transitory, the central bank should not be looking at short-run NAIRU in any 
case. 
James Stock made two comments. First, the issue regarding the sum of the 
coefficients in the Phillips curve came from the outward drift in the Phillips 
curve in the 1970s. Empricially, a good specification of inflation is a unit root 
with a moving average (MA). The MA has with a root of about 0.4, which 
implies a first AR  coefficient of 0.6. Richard Cluridu objected that with post- 
1979 data, a standard Dickey-Fuller test does find mean reversion in inflation. 435  Rethinking the Role of  NAIRU in Monetary Policy 
Mishkin noted that with a large MA coefficient, unit root tests are typically 
affected by a small-sample problem. In this case, a significant Dickey-Fuller 
test is on the order of 10 rather than 2.5. 
Stock’s second comment was that in terms of forecasting inflation, many 
variables have forecast better than unemployment over the last 30 years, such 
as the natural rate of new claims to unemployment insurance, capacity utiliza- 
tion, housing starts, and adjustments in any of these variables. 
Edward Gramlich asked Hall whether the sample mean in his estimation of 
NAIRU is subject to regime changes. Hull replied that this depends on the 
length of the sample. He mentioned  that Milton Friedman  avoided taking a 
stand on the issue of how long it takes for the sample mean of unemployment 
to respond to a change in policy regime. Regarding the question whether the 
natural rate of unemployment has declined in the last few years, there is per- 
suasive evidence that it has. Labor macroeconomists find that the duration of 
unemployment is extremely low. The labor market seems to deal better with 
routine unemployment, and computer matching starts mattering for the dura- 
tion of unemployment. 
David Longworth mentioned that none of the papers in the conference looks 
at the changes in the variances of  the equations themselves. There are some 
rules, such as inflation targeting, that would be expected to lower the variance 
in the Phillips curve. 
John Williams noted that the Phillips curve is estimated in the Federal Re- 
serve Board’s large-scale macroeconometric model by including expected in- 
flation on the right-hand side and then imposing the condition that the sum of 
coefficients on all leads and lags of inflation be one. 
Michael Woodford remarked that a policy rule based on the difference be- 
tween  NAIRU  and current unemployment, as defined by  these  authors, is 
equivalent to a policy rule based on inflation and a forecast of future inflation. 
He asked in that case why a discussion of  current economic conditions by 
policymakers should focus on beliefs about NAIRU rather than on inflation 
forecasts directly. This Page Intentionally Left Blank